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This article focuses on Italian foreign and security policy (IFSP). It looks at three 
examples of the country’s policy-making which reveal its poor results as a security 
provider, namely: Italy’s tardy reaction to the violence in Libya in 2011, its prompt 
reaction to the Lebanon crisis in 2006, and its efforts to be included in the diplomatic 
directorate, the P5+1, approaching relations with Iran in 2009. The article considers 
whether government action has bolstered the reliability of IFSP and, also, discusses 
the country’s FSP in terms of its basic differences from that of its partners in the 
European Union, France, Britain and Germany, envisaging how Italy could react to 
build more credibility. Italy’s policy is observed through a three-pronged analytical 
framework enriched by concepts of the logic of expected consequences (March and 
Olsen 1998). The article concludes that IFSP is predictable, but it must still reveal that 
it is reliable, and explains why this is the case.   
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Introduction  
Italy’s foreign policy has often been dismissed for punching below its weight, and for 
being too idiosyncratic and inconsistent (Missiroli 2000, Andreatta 2001, Croci 2002, 
Ignazi 2004, Romano 2006, Del Sarto and Tocci 2008, Croci and Lucarelli 2010, 
Carbone 2011, Walston 2011, Brighi 2011, Giacomello and Verbeek 2011). This 
judgement links to the question about whether Italy is a reliable foreign policy actor. 
Reliability suggests the quality of being trustworthy and in this context it may convey 
the idea of a foreign and security policy player who can be depended upon. This 
article develops its argument from a set of observations. Italy’s efforts to behave as a 
trustworthy foreign policy actor and security provider in its region offer the 
opportunity to discuss both Italy’s fear of being sidelined by France, Germany and 
Britain and the lessons that Italy could learn in order to improve the reputation of its 
foreign and security policy (IFSP). The focus on IFSP also offers the opportunity to 
examine the ‘conduct’ of the Italian policy-makers in terms of the expectations that 
they have may have thought would result from their actions. IFSP is perceived 
through a broader three-pronged analytical framework which is enriched by concepts 
of the logic of expected consequences (March and Olsen 1998).  
More often than not, nowadays, external security tensions are approached in a 
multilateral setting. Three examples illustrate Italy’s recent foreign and security 
policy: the country’s tardy reaction to the violence in Libya in 2011; its prompt 
reaction to the Lebanon crisis, in 2006; and its efforts to be included in the diplomatic 
directorate, the P5+1, determining relations with Iran,
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 in 2009. These events are 
focused upon in order to shed light on the modest roles played by Italy, and its 
exclusion from any key responsibilities. Therefore, there is an implicit limitation to 
this article in that the three examples are not fully analysed and contextualised in the 
same way that a case study would be.  
The article contends that, in the case of Lebanon, IFSP under Romano Prodi’s 
premiership was backed by strong multilateralism, but its influence was challenged by 
political instability. In the case of Libya, the change in the IFSP of Berlusconi’s 
cabinet was associated with the benefits that a coordinated action with France, Britain 
and other states would produce. In the case of cooperation with the P5 Plus ‘group’ on 
Iran, IFSP was based on the idea that Italian policy would derive influence and 
effectiveness by supporting the collective ‘norms’ of the group. These examples lead 
to the conclusion that IFSP is ‘predictable’, as it mainly linked with the common 
action, but that it has yet to show that it is reliable. The conclusion will explain the 
kind of commitment that Italy would need to make to demonstrate this.  
In the next section (section two), the article introduces the framework of analysis, 
then (section three) looks at the examples that reveal Italy’s poor results as a security 
provider, and successively (section four) considers whether government action has 
bolstered the reliability of IFSP, and (section five) discusses the country’s FSP in 
terms of its basic differences from that of France, Britain and Germany, envisaging 
how Italy could react to build more credibility. Then (section six), it explains IFSP in 
the light of the analytical framework, and finally (section seven) summarises the main 
conclusions. The article employs official documents, secondary sources and 
interviews with public officials.  
 
The framework of analysis  
 
Since external security tensions arise chiefly in a multilateral context, one of the main 
tasks is agreeing on aims together with other EU or non-EU states. There has been a 
reported tendency, especially in the area of the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP), towards consensus-seeking which goes beyond mere diplomatic declarations 
to a more proactive policy-making. There have been some notable exceptions – over 
Iraq in 2003, or in 2011 over Libya – which suggest that national considerations can 
still trump conceptions of any common European interests. Member states have, in 
that sense, been determined to retain their national prerogatives, even while 
strengthening their commitment to the Common Foreign Security Policy 
(CFSP)/CSDP in the Lisbon Treaty.  
Italy’s response to the violence in Libya, its reaction to the Lebanon crisis, and its 
attempts to enter the P5 Plus directorate on Iran, serve to point out its weak role and 
marginalisation from responsibilities. These events will be observed through a 
threefold analytical framework: how Italy has reacted to the changes in the 
international system that serve as the background to this article’s narrative; how its 
domestic politics have affected its foreign and security policy; and how the European 
Union has constrained or helped Italy’s positioning in the outside arena.  
Member states have consistently declared their interest in common action, largely 
on the basis that influence and effectiveness in foreign policy is, to a considerable 
extent, based on speaking and working together. March and Olsen (1998) foresee 
consensus-building via a logic of ‘expected consequences’, whether consensus is 
sought within the European Union, in a coalition of the willing, or in any other 
framework. They posit that the strategic calculation of rational bargaining suggests a 
logic of expected consequences when a government’s protection and defence of what 
it perceives as its national interest confronts but frequently becomes reconciled with 
the position of other states on the same policy issue.  
Put simply, a logic of expected consequences ‘explains’ foreign policy by offering 
an interpretation of the outcomes expected from it (p. 950). It sees political order as 
deriving from negotiation among rational actors following personal interests, in 
situations where there may be advantages attached to coordinated action (p. 949). It 
perceives politics as aggregating individual preferences into collective action through 
various processes of bargaining, coalition building and exchange (see Downs 1957; 
Niskanen 1971; Hechter and Kanazawa 1997). The criticism of this logic builds on 
the ‘presumptions’ in predicting consequences (Simon 1955, 1956), and on the fact 
that interests are mutable and inconsistent (March and Olsen 1998, 950; March 1978; 
Elster 1986, 1989).  
On the other hand, when the decision-makers tend to recognise the ethical 
dimensions and the collective norms of the group, March and Olsen identify a logic of 
appropriateness that motivates their behaviour. The logic of appropriateness embraces 
principled dimensions and aspirations (see March and Olsen 1989, 1995), and 
‘explains’ foreign policy as the application of rules, associated with specific identities, 
to specific circumstances.  
Yet, the division between the two logics is faint. Political actors are characterised 
both by their interests and by the rules ingrained in their identities and political 
institutions. However, ‘appropriateness need not attend to consequences’ (March and 
Olsen 1998, 951), in the sense that it does not include a focus on consequences. As 
March and Olsen specify, ‘the descriptive question is whether (or when) one logic is 
more likely than the other to be observed as the basis for actual behaviour’ (p. 949). 
The logic of expected consequences will suggest an explanation of the Italian policy-
makers’ attitude to IFSP with reference to the expectations that they have possibly 
assessed as deriving from their action.  
 
Unreliability? 
  
Italy would aspire to be considered by its EU and non-EU partners as a reliable 
foreign policy actor and security provider in its nearby region. Its efforts in gaining 
leadership, however, have produced no adequate results.  
During the recent crisis in Libya (February 2011), IFSP under the leadership of 
former Prime Minister Berlusconi and former Foreign Minister Franco Frattini, failed 
to respond promptly to the situation. Only six days after anti-government protests 
exploded in that country, Berlusconi denounced as unacceptable the use of force by 
the military regime, calling for a common effort to prevent the crisis degenerating into 
civil war (21 February). Domestic opposition politicians have argued that, as Libya’s 
closest western ally, Italy should have taken the lead in condemning the violence and 
mobilised its resources for humanitarian assistance. The country, initially, opposed 
objections to applying sanctions to the Libyan leader, when the European nations first 
discussed this issue. When the UN Security Council approved the no-fly zone over 
Libya, authorising all of the necessary measures to protect civilians (17 March 2011), 
Italy again took its time to adopt a clear position on the Gaddafi regime. Hinting at its 
40-year colonial rule of Libya, it first affirmed that ‘it would not take part in NATO-
led air strikes’, but the position slowly moved towards a more participative action, 
with former Defence Minister Ignazio La Russa declaring that: 
 
Precisely because we are close to Libya, our role cannot be that of renting rooms, 
offering the bases and the home key. It must be purposeful [and] moderate but 
determined. The Italian participation will see [our] country on the front line within the 
coalition of the willing. (Corriere della Sera 19 March 2011)  
 In fact, the country sought to gain leadership in the common action initiated by 
France, Britain and the US with the support of the Arab and European allies and 
American airpower – the Unified Protector Operation launched by NATO on 31 
March 2011, according to resolution 1973.
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 As Berlusconi announced in a statement, 
Italy ‘was ready to allow its jets to take “targeted military action”’. It hosted NATO’s 
joint force headquarters in Naples, and offered its air bases to assist with the 
implementation of the no-fly zone. Under the guidance of Operation EUFOR 
(European Union Force) Libya, within the legal framework laid down by the Council 
of the European Union (1 April 2011),
3
 Italy was prepared to offer humanitarian 
assistance in compliance with possible UN requests. Obtaining the guidance of 
EUFOR Libya was a positive sign from Italy’s European partners, possibly an 
indication of the county’s reliability, as Foreign Minister Frattini later recalled in the 
Chamber of Deputies (27 April 2011). However, an unnamed senior foreign diplomat 
commented that ‘it [was] a bit strange to put an Italian rear-admiral in charge of a 
command centre in Rome for an operation that [didn’t] exist and [that was] unlikely 
ever to be launched’ (Vogel 2011).4  Italy’s ‘nominal’ command of the proposed 
EUFOR Libya hardly suggests a recognised responsibility, and earned authority as a 
reliable player to lead a multilateral operation, as Italy has hoped. In terms of Italy’s 
desire to build up dependence on its external security action, the nominal command 
was a sign of failure.   
At other times, IFSP reacted promptly, when fast decision-making was needed. 
This was the case with the response in 2006, led by Prime Minister Prodi and Foreign 
Minister Massimo D’Alema, to the escalating violence and humanitarian suffering in 
its region, caused by Israel’s military intervention in Lebanon in July of that year. 
Italian policy was at the forefront of the rapid reaction force, by offering 3,000 
soldiers, at a time when France was offering 200 (New York Times 27 Aug 2006).
5
 It 
even contributed towards generating the political will to compose the military force, 
by requesting, at the Political Security Committee of 23 August, in Brussels, together 
with France and Spain, substantial troop contributions from the other member states. 
However, though Italy sought to assume operational command of the force at that 
time, France, facing intra-European pressure, boosted its military endeavour from 200 
to 2,000 troops, and wielded operational control over the mission (Gross 2009, 53).
6
 
Italy’s policy-makers possibly experienced this as having ‘the job’ taken over by 
France and by intra-European pressure, and they may have been dissatisfied about it, 
leading them possibly to acknowledge the limited expectations and trust that IFSP 
was able to attract. 
Also, a look at relations with Iran suggests a similarly modest assessment of Italy 
as a foreign policy and security actor. Foreign Minister Frattini’s policy, in 2009, 
showed that he sought to have Italy included within the diplomatic directorate and its 
approach to Iran, which was formed by France, Britain (and the other permanent 
members of the UN Security Council – Russia, China and the US) plus Germany 
(P5+1). Frattini was cited as saying that Italy ‘will not be left isolated by a restricted 
group of European partners plus the US’ (Financial Times 15 May 2008). Then, the 
Minister exhibited a proactive posture, boosting initiatives, both unilaterally and 
multilaterally, many of which failed to materialise. In February of that year, Frattini 
announced his visit to Iran, and a few days later cancelled it. The visit was meant to 
involve Iran in a debate on regional questions concerning Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
and was said to be a reasonable task, shaping a fair agenda (La Stampa 18 February 
2009). In the same year, when Italy was heading the G8, the Italian Foreign Minister 
invited his Iranian counterpart to attend the G8 summit on Afghanistan, in Trieste, but 
shortly afterwards withdrew his invitation, stating that ‘the facts at hand [...] have 
forced [him] to change [his] mind’ (Istituto Affari Internazionali 2009). Frattini’s 
foreign policy did not succeed in these various tasks. By contrast, in the end, a more 
substantial Italian policy was pursued in support of the political process put into 
action by the ‘restricted group of European partners’ within the directorate (the P5+1). 
With regard to the inclusion in the P5 Plus group on Iran, the key point of Frattini’s 
policy, there were a number of negative reactions. Germany was the main EU 
member opposing the option. The US was concerned with how big the framework 
would become if an additional country were to be admitted (Financial Times 15 May 
2008).  
This section has highlighted several weak aspects to the IFSP: the nominal 
command of an operation that was very unlikely to be launched (EUFOR Libya); the 
influences of France and other countries, at the European level, to delay Italy’s 
operational command of UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon); and the 
negative reactions, led by Germany and the US, to Italy’s abortive efforts to become 
part of the diplomatic directorate on Iran. These features seem to add up to 
unsatisfactory outcomes which uncover the reality that Italy faces, particularly in the 
light of its would-be aspirations.  
 
The government  
 
Has the government operated in the direction of bolstering the reliability of IFSP vis-
à-vis its international partners? The (centre-left) government at the time of the 
Lebanon crisis, led by Prodi (2006–8), former President of the European Commission, 
and by D’Alema’s conducting of foreign affairs, was deeply involved in 
multilateralism and team work, engaged in giving greater strength to the EU and the 
Commission (Missiroli 2007, 164), and inputs to policies for North Africa and the 
Middle East. For the above commitments – and for the earlier handling of its foreign 
policy agenda, joining Italy to the Economic Monetary Union during its 1996-8 
cabinet tenure – Prodi’s government was recognised as possessing both authority and 
international influence (Quaglia and Radaelli 2007). Prodi and D’Alema’s leadership 
was, however, undermined by political uncertainty. It came as no surprise to some, 
though as a paradox to others, that the left-wing parties caused the government’s 
collapse. Their international issues were salient to the point that no reasons were 
found to avoid a lethal clash. With regard to Europe, a concise statement that 
describes, whether rhetorically or not, the country’s general attitude, is the recognition 
that its Republican history had always ‘taken for granted that Italy’s national interests 
coincided with Europe’s interest’ (Carbone 2009, 98, 114; Newell 2010).  
The drive of Berlusconi (2008-11) – the longest-serving prime minister of the 
Italian Republic (Pasquino 2008) – and Frattini with regard to Italian external 
interests was, by contrast, totally personalised due to the premier’s style of individual 
and private relations and particular friendships with other foreign players, outside any 
apparent aspiration to establish multilateral links (Croci and Lucarelli 2010, 252). 
This tailored ‘behaviour’ of the premier’s distinct approach to policy-making was 
disconnected from the team players’ ‘method’ – which was developing in the various 
common forums and committees in Brussels, followed by the Italian government’s 
representatives to the European Union – of sharing problems and discussing solutions 
acceptable to the majority of member states. That behaviour and method were so 
unrelated that one may wonder what Berlusconi was actually acknowledging about 
the inputs and feedback concerning common policies suggested and recommended by 
the Italian EU representatives. Many expressions by Berlusconi would convey the 
idea of what Europe meant to his policy, but an old one still makes sense: Berlusconi 
embraced ‘Eurorealism based on a healthy mercantile spirit that refuses to lay down 
the cash before seeing the goods’ (Rossi 2002, 105). His government had not 
heightened the appeal of Italy’s external action (Marchi 2006). The international 
foreign policy community was also extremely troubled by the way in which the then 
prime minister promoted his personal ambitions, and protected his interests in the 
international arena (Furlong 2010). The European and international prestige of Italy 
declined under his tenure ‘so much that Italy was rarely or never invited to the 
British-Franco-German summits’ (Pasquino 2007, 50).  
Hence, neither instable governments nor personalised politics could contribute 
towards promoting the trustworthiness of IFSP vis-à-vis other states and international 
partners.  
  
How to react?   
 
How could Italy (and its government) best react to the possible situation of being 
sidelined by France, (intra-European pressures), Britain and Germany, when it 
approaches international issues? Understandably, Italy is not recognised as having 
such a status in the world arena as France, Britain and Germany, generally referred to 
as the Big Three (Major 2006). Its non-inclusion in the Big Three club is influenced 
by historically and culturally grounded values, which are often difficult to separate 
from one state’s vision of other states (Schmidt 2006).  
Italy is not like France. Italians have an impelling necessity to rescue their national 
pride along with their nation (Ferrara 2003). They do not hold ideas of grandeur as do 
the French, who remain vitally tied to the general grandeur objective – though the end 
of the Cold War together with external crises and shocks have produced the 
multilateralisation of French policies. Italians have been uneasy about the 
combination of military and civilian tools, particularly with force projection, boosted 
by the vision of the military as a crucial foreign policy instrument, which 
characterises French policy and politics (Interview February 2011).  
Italy is also unlike the United Kingdom, where the British find it essential to 
express a strong attachment to their own sovereignty, and have a self-perception as a 
great power. Britain, like France, has habitually employed its armed forces as a 
foreign policy instrument, along with its civilian resources, and is less hesitant 
regarding this choice than the other EU states. Italy, by contrast, perceives the need 
for a UN or an OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) 
mandate, before embarking on an operation utilising the military (see Marchi 2011, 
162–5).  
Italy is unlike Germany, too, though the Italians, like the Germans (Schmidt 2006), 
perceive the need to submerge their nation-state identity into the wider whole. Their 
choice of civilian means is like that of the Germans, and the Italian strategic culture 
encourages ‘cooperative security as opposed to national security’, analogously to the 
Germans. Peculiarly, Italian public opinion has accepted only a specific ‘Italian way 
of peacekeeping’ (Missiroli 2007, 165), which removes any idea of combat, 
emphasises post-stabilisation aid, and reduces the function of the military to that of a 
Non-Governmental Organisation. Yet, the Germans are keen to embrace an 
equivalent approach too (Giegerich 2006, 82, 84, 86). However, beyond these 
similarities, Italy does not have, and cannot enjoy, the standing which places German 
foreign policy within the P5 Plus group.   
In addition to these differences, which define these states’ foreign and security 
policies, there is the fact that France and Britain sit on the UN Security Council as 
permanent members, and ‘consider their UN standing as expressing a higher calling’. 
They have the prospect of representing the EU states at UNSC meetings, and have 
managed to maintain their freedom of manoeuvre at the UNSC through the 
formulation and passing of the treaties (Treaty of Maastricht art. J.5 and Treaty of 
Amsterdam Art. J.9). As a consequence, regarding the decisions to be taken at the 
UNSC, such as concerning peacekeeping and crisis management operations, Italy, 
together with the other EU partners, is, in a way, taken hostage by France and Britain 
and their policy (see Hill 2005).  
As for Italy’s foreign and security policy, the Italian military class had undergone 
‘a loss of reputation’ (Mini 2008). Throughout the Cold War, it avoided taking 
responsibility for its national defence, thus acknowledging its diminished sovereignty. 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Italy became incrementally active (Croci 2003, 
Missiroli 2007, Walston 2007, Carbone 2009, Romano 2009) through its participation 
in multinational security operations, apparently for two main reasons. Obviously, it 
was no longer assured of US protection. In addition, after the end of the Cold War in 
1998 the Saint Malo summit took place, marking the beginning of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy and common activity. Also, Italy’s preference for 
security action in a multilateral framework (see Fabbrini and Piattoni 2008), and its 
acquiring sense of responsibility in the governance of regional crises (Giacomello and 
Verbeek 2011), led the country to participate in twenty operations abroad (Senate 18 
Jan 2012, Di Paola, 9). Its newborn security activism, linked to its contributions to the 
multinational forces, had failed to preclude the country from being a willing ally in its 
involvement in both Iraq and Afghanistan from the very outset (Mallinson 2011). 
‘From Mozambique to Afghanistan, from Kosovo to Rwanda, not only has the Italian 
Army deployed paratroopers and rangers, but also heavy units and means’ (MoD 
2011; Ignazi, Giacomello and Coticchia 2012). Italy is the fourth largest contributor 
to missions under the guidance of the EU and NATO, and the ninth largest to 
missions run by the UN. The Italian military class is trying hard to build its 
reputation.  
Hence, with regard to the above question of how to react to being sidelined by 
other states, Italy’s government would need to generate some ‘strength’ and 
reconstruct IFSP credibility with both its European and non-European partners. 
Taking advantage of policy issues which have a particular resonance with national 
values (De Guttry 1993; Attina’ and Irrera 2009, 2010), namely its civilian rather then 
military action (Marta, Pirozzi and Ronzitti 2008; Miranda 2009), and fostering 
security cooperation in its nearest region would be a beneficial approach. Italian 
foreign and security policy would invest in those civilian operations that evoked 
approval and trust, recognised in the Italians by their transnational partners, and by 
those with whom the forces came into contact. It would capitalise on what has been 
acknowledged as the Italian style of peacekeeping, which has long served as a model 
for the management of international missions (Senate 18 January 2012, 15), and 
which mostly relates to deeper integration with those in the recipient country, and to 
skill at relating to different cultures and traditions (MoD 2011; Mini 2008). If the 
government succeeded in generating some strength, it would, perhaps, also diminish 
the perception that Italy is isolated from other states when engaging in international 
affairs.  
 What the framework of analysis reveals about IFSP behaviour  
 
Drawing on the three-fold analytical framework, and on the logic of expected 
consequences, the observation of IFSP, i.e. Italy’s response to the violence in Libya, 
its reaction to the Lebanon crisis and its attempt to be included in the P5 Plus, 
suggests two sets of considerations.   
Within the first set, an examination of the ways in which Italy has reacted to 
changes in the international system (i.e. the end of the Cold War, and the crises in 
Lebanon and in Libya) has found that these changes coincided with the greater 
activism of IFSP, and increased participation in peacekeeping and crisis management 
initiatives, with the remarkable exception of the Libyan case. Partly influencing the 
delay of the reaction to Libya was the non-aggression clause agreed by Berlusconi’s 
government with Tripoli in 2008. That international agreement ensured that Italy 
would not consent to the use of its territory for any ‘hostile act’ against Libya, or 
engage in ‘direct or indirect’ military action against it. That agreement was suspended 
on 28 February 2011. The hesitation of Berlusconi’s government regarding how to act 
with regard to Gaddafi had no positive effect on the reputation of IFSP as perceived 
from outside.  
Observation of how Italy’s domestic politics have affected foreign and security 
policy has shown that in the case of Lebanon, the multilateralism professed by Prodi 
ensured a rapid and firm decision of being operative. However, as far as the ‘overall’ 
credibility of Italy’s policy as assessed by its partners is concerned, the instability of 
Prodi’s government could do little to promote it. In the case of Libya, the fear of 
jeopardising the commercial interests of Italian companies also contributed to the 
delay of the government’s response. Eni SpA, the Italian integrated energy company, 
has been active in the North African country for more than half a century, leaving 
Italy dependent on Libya for a quarter of its crude oil. FIAT SpA and UniCredit SpA, 
to mention but a few enterprises, were partly owned by the Libyan government. 
Similarly, the prospect of safeguarding Italian industry and business in Iran was a 
strong inducement for former Foreign Minister Frattini’s attempts to be included in 
the P5 Plus group. The domestic politics perspective clearly indicated that Italy’s 
reputation at the European and international levels deteriorated under Berlusconi’s 
tenure.  
Consideration of whether the European Union constrained or helped Italy’s 
positioning in the external arena has yielded further results. In the case of Lebanon, 
the European Union, particularly the Political Security Committee, helped to gather 
forces, including those of Italy, for the peacekeeping action, though the operation was 
conducted within the United Nations framework of UNIFIL. In the case of Libya, the 
security action was undertaken within the NATO framework. NATO was more 
present than the EU, as a reference structure for the military intervention in the 
debates of the Lower House (27 April 2011), but this does not imply a weak tie to the 
common foreign and security policy of the European Union. The EU had been 
notoriously inactive as far as the Libyan crisis was concerned (Biscop 2011; Howorth 
2011; Menon 2011; Witney 2011). The EU is an important focus in the Italian 
commitment to peacekeeping operations in general, and has provided great support to 
the country’s evolution of its policy in this area, making progress and becoming more 
participative in the collective action.  
Within the second set of considerations, the analytical framework offers an 
interpretation of the Italian leaders’ conduct of the FSP concerning Libya and the P5 
Plus from the viewpoint of the expectations driving their action. It makes three main 
contributions.  
First, the Berlusconi’s government to the Gaddafi regime, at a time when this had 
severely lost legitimacy, confronted the position of the other states (France, Britain) 
and no less crucially the United States, which took important decisions on the Libya 
policy issue. Rational thinking and negotiation would have indicated that Italy would 
maintain its initially friendly stance towards Gaddafi. The Italian decision-makers, 
however, while in contact with their homologues in the decision-making process, 
were inclined to seek action according to the logic of expected consequences – i.e. 
neither normative nor ideological. In this way, then Prime Minister Berlusconi, in 
telephone calls with US President Obama and the European leaders, announced his 
decision, which shifted Italian policy towards pursuing choices favouring situations 
where there might have been ‘gains to coordinated action’ (M&O 1998, 949). Since 
Italy had previously declared that it would not take part in NATO-headed air strikes, 
the newly agreed behaviour now consisted of its approval to employ Italy’s air force 
in the NATO Libya mission. Because ‘coordination’ was accepted as an important 
issue in relation to the effects that it was expected to achieve, it was only after the 
then Minister of Defence La Russa met his counterparts in the various capitals, that he 
formed a determination to bring the Italian contribution into conformity with the 
commitment of France, the United Kingdom and the other allies in the coalition of the 
willing – as he communicated to the Lower House. This commitment was pragmatic. 
The provision of combat aircraft
7
 was likely to give access to significant political 
opportunities that would open up following the crisis. La Russa appeared to confirm 
this:   
 
the Italian contribution ‘will correspond also to the possibility of influencing the 
choices of international strategy, bringing peace and security … and therefore have a 
voice in the chapter of the consequences that the crisis produced’ (Chamber 27 April 
2011, p. 10-11).  
 
Consequentialists see these changes in behaviour as connected to the benefits that the 
new positions would bring about.  
Second, Italy was, then, able to agree with France and Britain to send military 
advisers to assist the Benghazi-based rebel Transitional National Council (TNC), in 
its battle against the pro-Gaddafi forces. Consequentialists again suggest that 
coordinated action may represent ‘a collection of “contracts” negotiated among actors 
with varying interests’ (March and Olsen 1998, 949). Former Foreign Minister 
Frattini had, previously, loudly voiced the ‘threat’ of losing infrastructure projects 
worth €4bn, agreed by Italian companies in Libya under the Gaddafi regime (Krause 
2011). Giving support to the practices of consensus building at a supranational level 
(i.e. joining the position of France, Britain and other states, on their decisions on 
Libya) was not the same as saying that Italy renounced its national interests. In the 
end, representatives of the TNC and Libyan representatives from the oil industry 
made known their intention to form a ‘business continuity’, and their resolve that ‘the 
previous government’s international obligations’ would be respected (Miozzo 2011).  
 Third, the attempts of then Foreign Minister Frattini to gain a deeper engagement 
with IFSP conjointly with the other EU and non-EU states over Iran, in the end 
showed that the Italian policy-makers, instead of neglecting to support the 
institutionalised contact group on that country, predictably endorsed cooperation with 
the P5 Plus. Yet, by assessing the likely value of the available choices, Italians were 
induced to accept that the influence and effectiveness of their policy were, to a 
considerable extent, based on supporting the collective ‘norms’ of the group. This 
‘consequentialist behaviour’, however, was not meant to bolster the institutional 
framework within which the P5 Plus forwarded security policy, but was the least 
‘high priced’ choice from the political viewpoint. Others may disagree and may argue 
that Frattini, et alia in the government, followed the logic of appropriateness, since 
the action of applying sanctions to Iran was ‘rule-based’ and operated within 
principles that ‘lead to better and safer societies’. Nevertheless, consequentialists 
contend that the political actors also estimated the consequences (March and Olsen 
1998, 951). If asked why they followed the procedural norms, they would reply: 
‘because I have to preserve the international reputation of the Italian government’ 
(Interview March 2012). These two sets of considerations lead to the conclusions.  
 
Conclusions  
 
This article focused on some modest roles taken by Italy and exclusions from key 
responsibilities while it pursued its foreign and security policy in a multilateral forma, 
on Libya, Lebanon and within the P5 Plus directorate on Iran. Italy’s aspiration for 
gaining leadership, and reliability as a foreign policy and security player that could be 
depended upon in its close neighbourhood, contrasted with the reality challenging 
Italy. The reality unveiled the fear of being isolated by France, Britain, intra-European 
pressure and Germany, while Italy approached crisis management and other 
international issues. The article claimed that the IFSP could have been strengthened 
neither by the multilateralism weakened by the governmental instability of Prodi and 
D’Alema nor by the policy style of Berlusconi and Frattini,  disengaged as it was 
from the team player approach promoted in Brussels to sharing decisions by most EU 
member states. The article’s emphasis on the lesson that Italy would learn from its 
concerns considered the differences between Italy, France, Britain and Germany and 
their FSP. It argued that capitalising on those civilian operations that bore witness to 
the approval and trust of their partners (and operational counterparts) would be the 
right approach for the IFSP to gain credibility in the international arena. 
The framework of analysis has explained the effects on IFSP of the changes in the 
international system, of domestic politics, as well as of the European Union 
concerning Italy’s position in the external arena. With the help of the logic of 
expected consequences, the framework has shown that the Italian policy-makers paid 
great attention to the policies of France, Britain, Germany and the US, whether on 
Libya or on Iran. It demonstrated that the policy-makers’ conduct was motivated by 
the expectations that action coordinated with France, Britain and other partners 
appeared likely to bring about. An example of these expectations was the acquisition 
of the political opportunities that opened up following the Libyan crisis, and another 
was the continuity of business initiated under Gaddafi’s governance. The framework 
also disclosed that coordination with the P5 Plus was meant to safeguard the 
international reputation of the Italian government.  
As far as policy reliability is concerned, this article’s conclusion contends that 
Italian foreign and security policy is ‘predictable’ because, in spite of the uncertainties 
and delays associated with agreeing with Italy’s EU and non-EU partners, it mostly 
contributed to the common action. It maintains, however, that IFSP has still to reveal 
that it is reliable. For that task, it has to demonstrate its ability to engage at least on 
two fronts. At the international level, that would involve multilateral civilian security 
operations with its partners, when the need arises, and according to its capabilities as 
described above. At the domestic level, it would guarantee long-lasting governments. 
When Italy is able to meet these aims, it will, without doubt, remove the perception of 
being isolated by other states in international affairs.   
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Notes  
                                                 
1
 France, Britain and the other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council – Russia, 
China and the US – plus Germany.  
2
 Rome’s contribution was controversial: the French military forces were commanded by the operative 
centre in Lyon, and the British by the headquarters in Northwood. Italy felt it played no influential role 
and argued for the use of Napoli Capodichino airport (Marizza 2011). 
3
 Italy provided the EU Operation Commander (Rear Admiral Gaudiosi) and the Operational 
Headquarters in Rome. Council of the European Union (8589/11). 
4
 As the diplomat explained, ‘there was a lot of pressure by the French and others to demonstrate that 
the EU is a military player’.  
5
 D’Alema to The New York Times.  
6
 The peacekeeping force, in the end, had the UN mark, UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in 
Lebanon). Italy seized command over the mission only later, in February 2007.   
7
 The country’s provision of combat aircraft consisted of four aircraft of the Eurofighter or F16 type for 
defence tasks, four Tornado ECRs that were capable of launching missiles to destroy Libyan radars and 
suppress Libyan defence, and four AV-8B Plus set on the warship Garibaldi for air defence and 
recognition.  
 
References  
 
Andreatta, F. 2001. ‘Italy at a crossroads: the foreign policy of a medium power after the end of bipolarity’, 
Daedalus, 130, 2: 45-54. 
Attina’, F. and Irrera, D. 2010. ‘Humanitarian NGOs, peacebuilding and reconstruction. Preliminary 
results of a survey analysis’, Paper to ‘Responsibility 2 Rebuild. Linking Infrastructure, Governance 
and Democratisation’ Workshop, University of Surrey, Guildford, 18–19 June.    
Biscop, S. 2011. ‘Mayhem in the Mediterranean: Three Strategic Lessons for Europe’, Security Policy 
Brief, no. 19, EGMONT, Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels, April.     
Brighi, E. 2011. ‘Resisting Europe? The Case of Italy’s Foreign Policy’, in National and European 
Foreign Policies Towards Europeanisation, edited by C. Hill and R. Wong. London: Routledge.  
                                                                                                                                           
Carbone, M. 2009. ‘Italy in the European Union, between Prodi and Berlusconi’, The International 
Spectator, 44/3: 97-115.  
Carbone, M. 2011. ‘Introduction: Understanding Italy’s Role on the World Stage’, in Italy in the Post-Cold 
War Order. Adaptation, Bipartisanship, Visibility, edited by M. Carbone. Lanham: Rowman. 
Chamber 27 April 2011. ‘Comunicazioni del Governo sui recenti sviluppi della situazione in Libia’, 
Commissioni Riunite III (Affari Esteri e Comunitari) -IV (Difesa) della Camera dei Deputati e3a 
(Affari Esteri, Emigrazione) -4a (Difesa) del Senato della Repubblica Resoconto Stenografico.  
http://www.camera.it/470?shadow_organo_parlamentare=1496&stenog=/_dati/leg16/lavori/stencomm/
0304c0304/audiz2/2011/0427&pagina=s010 (accessed December 2011).  
Corriere della Sera 19 March 2011. ‘Da Parigi via libera all’attacco. Obama: “Azione limitata degli 
USA”’, www.corriere.it/esteri/11_marzo_19/vertice-parigi-libia (accessed December 2011). 
Council of the European Union (8589/11). Presse 91, Brussels, 1 April 2011. Available from: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/121237.pdf (accessed 
April 2011).  
Croci, O. 2002. ‘The Second Berlusconi Government and Italian Foreign Policy’, The International 
Spectator, 2: 89-101.  
Croci, O. 2003. ‘Italian security policy after the Cold War’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 8, 2: 266-
283.  
Croci, O. and Lucarelli, S. 2010. ‘Introduction: Italy in the eyes of others’, Modern Italy Vol. 15, No. 3: 
251-257.  
De Guttry, A. 1993. ‘La cooperazione nel campo della sicurezza e della polizia’, in L’Italia nella politica 
internazionale, Bologna: Il Mulino, 20, 307-327.  
Del Sarto, R. and Tocci, N. 2008. ‘Italy’s politics without policy: balancing Atlanticism and Europeanism 
in the Middle East’, Modern Italy, 13, 2, 291-303. 
Downs, A. 1957.  An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper and Raw.   
Elster, J. 1986. The Multiple Self, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Elster, J. 1989. The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Fabbrini, S. and Piattoni, S. eds. 2008.  Italy in the European Union: Redefining National Interests in a 
Compound Polity, Lanham: Rowman.   
Ferrara, M. 2003. ‘Un’Italia salvata dall’Europa, ma ancora libera di danneggiare se stessa’, in 
L’Europeizzazione dell’Italia, edited by S. Fabbrini. Bari: Laterza, 243-254.  
Financial Times 15 May 2008. ‘Italy sets sights on joining “very firm” approach to Iran’.  
Furlong, P. 2010. ‘Processes of Italian foreign policy since 1989’, paper to Workshop on Italy, Pembroke 
College, Cambridge, May. 
Giacomello, G. and Verbeek, B., eds. 2011.  Italy’s Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century: The New 
Assertiveness of an Aspiring Middle Power, Lanham: Rowman.  
Giegerich, B. 2006.  European Security and Strategic Culture, Baden-Baden: Nomos.  
Gross, E. 2009. The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy, Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Hechter, M. and Kanazawa, S. 1997. ‘Sociological Rational Choice Theory’, Annual Review of Sociology 
23: 191-214.  
Hill, C. 2005. ‘The European dimension of the UN Security Council’, The International Spectator, 4: 31-
39.  
Howorth, J. 2011. ‘The European Union in (In-)Action: Brussels and the Arab Spring’. The Bulletin of the 
Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illinois, Vol. XIX, 
No. 1: 17-20.  
Ignazi, P. 2004. ‘Al di la’ dell’Atlantico, al di qua dell’Europa: dove va la politica estera italiana’, Il 
Mulino, 2: 267-276.  
Ignazi, P., Giacomello, G. and Coticchia, F. 2012.  Italian Military Operations Abroad: Just Don’t Call it 
War, Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Interview February 2011. Author’s interview with a French public official, Rome and Lyon. 
Interview March 2012. Author’s interview with an Italian former ambassador, Rome.  
Istituto Affari Internazionali. 2009.  http://www.iai.it/pdf/Cronologia/chronology_2009.pdf (accessed 
March 2010). 
Krause, F. 2011. ‘Berlusconi’s “Slavish” Courtship of Qaddafi Haunts Italy’, 23 February. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-23/berlusconi-s-slavish-courtship-of-qaddafi-to-befriend-
libya-haunts-italy.html (accessed December 2011).  
La Stampa 18 February 2009. ‘Frattini vola in Afghanistan: “Iran possibile interlocutore”’,  
      http://www.lastampa.it/redazione/cmsSezioni/esteri/200902articoli/41140girata.asp (accessed March 
2010). 
                                                                                                                                           
Mallinson, A. 2011. ‘An opportunity in a crisis: Italy’s new defence minister bodes well for British 
interests’, Mail online, 22 November. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2064663/Italy-s-new-
defence-minister-Giampaolo-Di-Paola-bodes-British-interests.html (accessed 20 December 2011). 
Major, C. 2006. ‘The European Security and Defence Policy: Preserve of a Franco-German-British 
Directorate?’. Paper to the International Studies Association Convention, San Diego, 22–25 March.    
March, J. G. 1978. ‘Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice’, Bell Journal of 
Economics 9: 587-608.  
March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P. 1989. ‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life’ 
American Political Science Review 78: 734-749.  
March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P. 1995. Democratic Governance, New York: Free Press.  
March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P. 1998. ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders’, 
International Organization 52, 4: 943-969.  
Marchi, L. 2006. ‘Italy’s European Vocation Put at Risk?’, in Politics and Culture in Post-War Italy, 
edited by L. Risso and M. Boria. Newcastle, Cambridge Scholars Publishing: 203-221.  
Marchi, L. 2011. ‘Fit for what? Towards explaining battlegroup inaction’, European Security 20/2: 155-
184.  
Marizza, G. 2011. ‘Retroscena della campagna di Libia: la disputa sulla catena di comando’, 
L’Occidentale, 26 marzo. http://www.loccidentale.it/node/103876 (accessed December 2011).  
Marta, L., Pirozzi, M. and Ronzitti, N. 2008. ‘Le missioni italiane all’estero: Afghanistan e Libano’. 
L’Italia e la politica internazionale, Bologna: Il Mulino.  
Menon, A. 2011. ‘European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya’ Survival vol. 53, no. 3: 75-90.  
Mini, F. 2008. Soldati, Torino, Einaudi.  
Miozzo, A. 2011. ‘EU: “Gaddafi is a spectre and remains a worrying presence”’, Euronews 8 September. 
http://www.euronews.net/2011/09/08/libya-gaddafi-is-a-spectre-and-remains-a-worrying-presenceeu-
crisis-response-/ (accessed 16 November 2011).  
Miranda, V. 2009. ‘Report of the Workshop “Italy’s Participation in EU Civilian Missions. Critical 
Aspects and Future Persepectives”’, November. http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iai0931.pdf (accessed 
December 2011).  
Missiroli, A. 2000. ‘Italy’, in The Foreign Policies of the European Union Member States, edited by I. 
Manners and R. Whitman. Manchester: Manchester University Press: 87-104.  
Missiroli, A. 2007. ‘Italy’s security and defence policy: between the EU and the USA, or just Prodi and 
Berlusconi? Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, 9, 2: 149-168.  
MoD 2011. Italian Ministry of Defence, ‘Missions Abroad’. http://www.esercito.difesa.it/en-
US/Activity/MissionsAbroad/Pages/default.aspx?status=In%20atto (accessed December 2011).  
Newell, J. 2010. Politics of Italy: Governance in a Normal Country, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press.    
Niskanen, W. A. 1971. Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Chicago: Rand McNally.  
The New York Times 27 August, 2006.  I. Fisher, ‘Italy’s Gesture on Lebanon Yields Pride and Worry’, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/d/massimo_dalema/index.html (accessed 
March 2011). 
Pasquino, G. 2007. ‘The Five Faces of Silvio Berlusconi: The Knight of Anti-politics’, Modern Italy vol. 
12, No. 1: 39-54.  
Quaglia, L. and Radaelli, C. 2007. ‘Italian politics and the European Union: A tale of two research 
designs’, West European Politics, 30, 4: 924-43.   
Romano, S. 2006. ‘Berlusconi’s foreign policy: inverting traditional priorities’, The International 
Spectator, 41, 2: 101-107.   
Romano, S. 2009. ‘Italian foreign policy after the end of the Cold War’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 
14, 1: 8-14.  
Rossi, L. 2002. ‘New Trends in Italy’s European Policy’, The International Spectator, 37, 1: 97-106.    
Schmidt, V. 2006. Democracy in Europe. The EU and National Polities. Oxford, Oxford University Press.  
Senate 18 January 2012. ‘Comunicazioni del Governo sulla Partecipazione dell’Italia alle Missioni 
Internazionali’, Commissioni Riunite e Congiunte, 3a (Affari esteri, emigrazione) e 4a (Difesa) del 
Senato della Repubblica, e III ( Affari esteri e comunitari) e IV (Difesa) della Camera dei deputati. 
Giunte e Commissioni, Resoconto Stenografico n. 9, Senato della Repubblica, XVI Legislatura.  
      http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/DF/277645.pdf (accessed April 2012).  
Simon, H. A. 1955. ‘A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 69: 99-118.  
Simon, H. A. 1956. ‘Rational Choioce and the Structure of the Environment’, Psychological Review 63: 
129-118.   
Vogel, T. 2011. ‘A lack of military might’, European Voice, 5 May.  
                                                                                                                                           
      http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/a-lack-of-military-might/70982.aspx (accessed 
December 2011).  
Walston, J. 2007. ‘Italian Foreign Policy in the “Second Republic”. Changes of Form and Substance’, 
Modern Italy Vol. 12, No. 1: 91-104. 
Walston, J. 2011. ‘Italian Foreign Policy since the end of the Cold War’, in Carbone, M. (ed), op. cit. 
Whitney, N. 2011. ‘How to Stop the Demilitarisation of Europe’, Policy Brief no. 40, European Council 
on Foreign Relations, November. 
 
